OpenLDAP search filters

I use LDAP authentication on several Web servers. For the first time, I have a Web application that I want to open to customers as well as staff. Usually, I just put the users into a group. Apache validates the password against LDAP and checks for group membership, and either accepts or rejects the request. The relevant Apache configuration looks like this:

AuthLDAPURL “ldap://ldap1.domain.com/ou=people,dc=domain,dc=com” STARTTLS
AuthLDAPGroupAttribute memberUid
require ldap-group cn=groupname,ou=groups,dc=domain,dc=com

Apache requires that I specify where to look for accounts, as shown in bold above. My customers are in a different OU than my coworkers. (It would have made more sense to name the “people” container “staff,” but I didn’t realize that at the time.) Apache will accept a filter in AuthLDAPURL, letting you check in multiple groups. I’ve never taken the time to understand LDAP filters, so I guess I better start now. I’ll write my first filters for ldapsearch(1), and then carry them over to Apache.

Normally, I run ldapsearch like so:

# ldapsearch -WxZD "cn=manager,dc=domain,dc=com"
Enter LDAP Password:

-W tells ldapsearch to ask for a password, -x sets simple auth, -Z toggles startTLS, and -D indicates a bind DN follows. While I have an inherent dislike of typing a password on the command line, I’m going to run many LDAP searches in quick succession on a test machine. My test machine doesn’t use the same password as my production environment, so I’m willing to make an exception for convenience. Drop the -W, and add the password with -w. Specify the password in quotes to escape symbols and such.

# ldapsearch -xZD "cn=manager,dc=domain,dc=com" -w "password"

You should get a dump of your LDAP directory.

Now to build up a filter iteratively, figuring out how they work as we go. ldapsearch expects the filter to be the last item on the command line. Put it in quotes, to escape special characters.

# ldapsearch -xZD "cn=manager,dc=domain,dc=com" -w "password" "(uid=mwlucas)"

This returns only my user account, as I would expect. Now let’s search for one of two accounts, joined by an OR. I’m going to stop including the entire command line, and only list the filter at the end.

"(|(uid=mwlucas)(uid=mwlucas2))"

The OR operator is a pipe symbol (|). It’s followed by the two possible choices, each in parenthesis. This filter matches any entry where the uid is either mwlucas or mwlucas2. I get information for two accounts back.

Similarly, I can search for a group by CN as well as a username. I want to see everything with a UID of “mwlucas” or matching the CN “cacti”.

"(|(uid=mwlucas)(cn=cacti))"

Entries for my account and this group appear.

About this time I realize that I can probably fix my Apache problem by removing the ou=people entry in AuthLDAPURL, giving me:

AuthLDAPURL “ldap://ldap1.domain.com/dc=domain,dc=com” STARTTLS

I try it and, yes, users from both OUs can now log in. But I'm going to learn about search filters, anyway.

I can use two additional logical operators, AND (&) and NOT(!).

Also, filters support wildcards. For example, here I want to see all accounts that have the initials "mwl" in them. I've created more than one test account, and want to be sure that I remember all of them.

(uid=*mwl*)

That generates a lot of output, though. I'm more interested in a list of UIDs. If you specify an attribute after the filter, ldapsearch will only print that attribute. Here's the whole command string for this search.

# ldapsearch -xZD "cn=manager,dc=domain,dc=com" -w "password" "(uid=*mwl*)" uid
...ldap internal stuff deleted...
# mwlucas, people, domain.com
dn: uid=mwlucas,ou=people,dc=domain,dc=com
uid: mwlucas

# mwltest, people, domain.com
dn: uid=mwltest,ou=people,dc=domain,dc=com
uid: mwltest

# mwlstaff, people, domain.com
dn: uid=mwlstaff,ou=people,dc=domain,dc=com
uid: mwlstaff

# mwlucas2, customers, domain.com
dn: uid=mwlucas2,ou=customers,dc=domain,dc=com
uid: mwltest2

That's enough filtering to make my day-to-day life easier, so I'll get back to the problem I'm really trying to solve today.

Adding IPv6 to a FreeBSD Mail/Web Server

We’ve run out of IPv4 addresses. If you’re not already on IPv6, start hoarding gasoline and canned potted meat food product. Doomsday is here, film at eleven. Or, failing that, start running IPv6 on something so you can have a little familiarity with the new Internet protocol before you absolutely must. My personal FreeBSD 9 server (which hosts my email, this blog, web sites for my books, and a whole bunch of other equally trivial cruft) is now IPv6-enabled, even though the local site doesn’t have IPv6 connectivity. Here’s how I did it.

Establishing IPv6 connectivity to and from an IPv4-only server breaks requires:

  • Get an IPv6 tunnel from a tunnel provider
  • Configure a generic IPv4 tunnel to the tunnel provider
  • Assign IPv6 addresses to your IPv4 generic tunnel
  • Assign your IPv6 default route over the tunnel
  • Establish IPv6 DNS resolution
  • Configure services to run on IPv6
  • Offer IPv6 DNS records

    If you’re reading this , you probably don’t have IPv6 at your facility. You’ll need an IPv6 tunnel, offered for free by many providers. I used Hurricane Electric, but use any broker you like. Sign up for an account, respond to the verification mail, and request a tunnel. The Web interface will give you a bunch of details about your tunnel.

    The gif interface provides a generic IPv4 tunnel that can be used for many protocols. Configuring an IPv4 tunnel requires only the IP addresses on each end. ifconfig(8) creates a tunnel with just:

    # ifconfig gif0 tunnel 198.22.63.8 209.51.181.2

    You must be able to ping the tunnel’s remote address.

    Now assign IPv6 addresses to your gif0 tunnel.

    # ifconfig gif0 inet6 your-IPv6-address remote-IPv6-address prefixlen 128

    For example, my HE-assigned IPv6 tunnel endpoint is 2001:470:1f10:b9c::2. The he.net IPv6 address is 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1. I assign my IPv6 addresses as:

    # ifconfig gif0 inet6 2001:470:1f10:b9c::2 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1 prefixlen 128

    Verify that your IPv6 addresses are correctly configured by using ping6 to hit the far end. Remember, standard ping will not work — ping is specific to IPv4.

    # ping6 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1
    PING6(56=40+8+8 bytes) 2001:470:1f10:b9c::2 –> 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1
    16 bytes from 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1, icmp_seq=0 hlim=64 time=19.209 ms
    16 bytes from 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1, icmp_seq=1 hlim=64 time=21.661 ms

    At this point, you have IPv6. Now assign the IPv6 default route to the remote end of the tunnel.

    # route -n add -inet6 default 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1

    Your server will now send all IPv6 traffic across your IPv4 tunnel, while still routing IPv4 traffic as usual. Remember, IPv4 and IPv6 are different protocols.

    Some Internet sites, such as Google, have special requirements for accessing their IPv6 DNS. Your tunnel broker provides an IPv6-aware DNS server. Now that you have a default route, see if you can ping6 it. If you can ping the DNS server, edit /etc/resolv.conf. Remove your IPv4 nameservers. Add the IPv6 nameserver. Check DNS for IPv4 (A records) and IPv6 (AAAA records) with dig(1).

    # dig www.google.com A

    ;; ANSWER SECTION:
    www.google.com. 20478 IN CNAME www.l.google.com.
    www.l.google.com. 222 IN A 209.85.225.99
    www.l.google.com. 222 IN A 209.85.225.147
    www.l.google.com. 222 IN A 209.85.225.104
    www.l.google.com. 222 IN A 209.85.225.105
    www.l.google.com. 222 IN A 209.85.225.103
    www.l.google.com. 222 IN A 209.85.225.106

    This looks correct. Let’s try AAAA records.

    # dig www.google.com AAAA

    www.google.com. 20368 IN CNAME www.l.google.com.
    www.l.google.com. 180 IN AAAA 2001:4860:b007::63

    This is an IPv6 answer. Google has fewer IPv6 servers than IPv4 servers, but that’s to be expected these days.

    Now configure services on your server to listen on IPv6 addresses. Daemons included in FreeBSD listen to IPv6 by default. Run sockstat -6 to see what programs are listening to your new IPv6 address. In my case, Apache only listened to IPv4. At some point in the foggy past, I had turned off IPv6 when configuring the port. I rebuilt devel/apr1 and www/apache22 with IPv6 support, restarted Apache, and it listened to my IPv6 address without issue.

    Last, you must publish AAAA records for the hosts you want to offer over IPv6. By gradually adding AAAA records, you can slowly increase the amount of traffic you deliver over IPv6, letting your your IPv6 traffic grow slowly.

    www IN A 198.22.63.8
    www IN AAAA 2001:470:1f10:b9c::2

    Properly-configured hosts will attempt to connect to services on IPv6 first. If those connection attempts fail, they will try IPv4 instead.

    To make your FreeBSD changes permanent, use your addresses in the /etc/rc.conf entries below.

    gif_interfaces=”gif0″
    gifconfig_gif0=”198.22.63.8 209.51.181.2″
    ipv6_network_interfaces=”gif0 lo0″
    ifconfig_gif0_ipv6=”inet6 2001:470:1f10:b9c::2 2001:470:1f10:b9c::1 prefixlen 128″
    ipv6_defaultrouter=”2001:470:1f10:b9c::1″

    Lastly, tell your users that you have IPv6. Otherwise, nobody will notice. It’s that transparent.

  • tracking latency, loss, and jitter with SmokePing

    Most network monitoring tools retry failed connections. snmpwalk sends multiple SNMP queries, giving the agent multiple chances to respond. Nagios lets you configure how often you retry queries, and specifically delays alarms to avoid transient issues. You do not want your pager going off at 3AM because something dropped a single packet! Losing a packet or two on occasion is fine, but losing one or two every time you run a check is a problem — and most monitoring tools can’t tell the difference. Don’t just crank up your monitoring software’s loss tolerance. You must know how often your network drops requests. That’s where SmokePing comes in. SmokePing measures loss, latency, and jitter for ICMP and application-level requests.

    SmokePing is in the FreeBSD ports as /usr/ports/net-mgmt/smokeping, OpenBSD ports as /usr/ports/net/smokeping, and NetBSD as /usr/pkgsrc/net/smokeping. My example server is FreeBSD 9, with SmokePing 2.4.2.

    The SmokePing port offers several different probes, or utilities for performing checks. In this example we’ll use the default probe, fping. While other probes, such as measuring DNS response time, are useful, they don’t address today’s day job problem.

    SmokePing is configured in /usr/local/etc/smokeping/config. The config file is a little different than most; it’s neither XML-ish nor C-esque. A hash mark is still a comment. Three asterisks marks off a configuration section. SmokePing uses a hierarchical configuration for monitoring hosts, and an item’s depth in the hierarchy is dictated by the number of plus signs before it. Variables are set with equals signs. It’s easy enough once you work through it a bit.

    Here’s the basic settings:


    *** General ***
    owner = mwlucas
    contact = mwlucas@blackhelicopters.org
    mailhost = mail.blackhelicopters.org
    sendmail = /usr/sbin/sendmail

    The Web interface needs some paths. I put my Web sites under /var/www/site/application. On this server, I want any local SmokePing stuff under /var/www/monitor/smoke. I’ll also use Apache aliases to direct part of the site to the directory where the port installed the files.

    imgcache = /var/www/monitor/smoke/images
    imgurl = https://monitor.blackhelicopters.org/smoke-images/
    datadir = /var/db/smoke
    piddir = /usr/local/var/smokeping/
    cgiurl = https://monitor.blackhelicopters.org/smoke/smokeping.cgi
    smokemail = /usr/local/etc/smokeping/smokemail
    tmail = /usr/local/etc/smokeping/tmail
    # specify this to get syslog logging
    syslogfacility = local0

    Create the directories assigned to datadir and imagesdir. The user smokeping must own the directory assigned to datadir. The Web server user (www) must own the imagesdir.

    As a general rule, I don’t permit applications write to files in the same directory that they’re installed in. It interfered with package management and added to security problems. Perhaps that’s not such a big concern these days, but I’m kind of old-school.

    Configure /etc/syslog.conf to log local0 to /var/log/smokeping.

    local0.* /var/log/smokeping

    I’m not configuring alarms right now, so you can comment out the line *** Alerts *** and everything beneath it until the next section. Similarly, comment out the entire *** Slaves *** section.

    Leave “Presentation” and “Database” alone, unless you a) understand RRD and want to muck with the innards of how SmokePing stores its data, and b) understand SmokePing. If you’re reading this article to learn about SmokePing, you automatically fail b).

    Under the Probes header, ensure the path to FPing is correct.

    The interesting bit is the Targets section. Here’s where you define which hosts you want to ping. SmokePing uses a hierarchical configuration that both lists the hosts you want to monitor and how you want the results displayed.

    *** Targets ***
    probe = FPing

    menu = Top
    title = Network Latency Grapher
    remark = Welcome to BH.org SmokePing.

    This header tells SmokePing that we’re configuring objects to be checked with FPing. We set a menu section and title, then proceed to the first target.


    + Southfield
    menu = Southfield
    title = Southfield

    ++ router6
    host = router6.blackhelicopters.org
    ++ router8
    host = router8.blackhelicopters.org

    + chi
    menu = Chicago
    title = Chicago
    ++ chi-1
    host=chi-1.blackhelicopters.org

    Here I’ve set up two first-level menus, Southfield (a suburb of Detroit) and Chicago. The Southfield menu has two entries beneath it. Each sub-entry has a title (indicated with ++) and a host. SmokePing will check these routers with FPing, and will create an interactive menu on the Web site arranging them as you have here.

    Set smokeping_enable=YES in /etc/rc.conf, and run /usr/local/etc/rc.d/smokeping start. Check /var/log/smokeping (you did set up syslog, didn’t you?) for any errors.

    Now the Web interface. FreeBSD’s package installed SmokePing’s CGI and related files in /usr/local/smokeping/htdocs. I want to use /var/www/monitor/smoke/images/ as the image cache. My httpd.conf for this is:

    Alias /smoke/ "/usr/local/smokeping/htdocs/"

    Options ExecCGI
    AllowOverride None
    Allow from All
    AddHandler cgi-script cgi

    Alias /smoke-images/ "/var/www/monitor/smoke/images/"

    I control access to my network management Web sites with LDAP. If you want to restrict with Apache’s IP address ACLs instead, change the Allow from All to something more suitable. Don’t open SmokePing to the world. Your customers and/or users will find it and ask a lot of inconvenient questions.

    SmokePing creates graphs indicating the average ping request latency in a green line, with smoky grey/black bars indicating jitter. When SmokePing loses packets, the line color changes.

    I’ll probably write more about SmokePing, as this hardly touches the surface. Tracking things like DNS query latency can help narrow down server-side problems.

    upgrading to OpenBSD-current, the stupid way

    My desktop runs an OpenBSD snapshot from April 2010. It’s well past time I upgraded. OpenBSD’s usual upgrade path works quite well, but I’m simultaneously lazy and willing to reinstall this system from scratch if something ghastly happens. (This might also invalidate any bug report you send.)

    Don’t do this if you have any need or respect for your computer. I treat my desktop with a mix of indifference and contempt, so I’ll proceed.

    Back up your data. I attached my external 1TB USB drive. /var/log/messages shows:

    Jan 21 10:08:17 avarice /bsd: sd0 at scsibus2 targ 1 lun 0: SCSI2 0/direct fixed
    Jan 21 10:08:17 avarice /bsd: sd0: 953869MB, 512 bytes/sec, 1953525168 sec total

    It’s device sd0. What partitions are on it?

    $ sudo disklabel sd0
    ...16 partitions:
    # size offset fstype [fsize bsize cpg]
    c: 1953525168 0 unused
    i: 1953520002 63 MSDOS

    I want to mount sd0i.

    $ sudo mount_msdos /dev/sd0i /mnt/
    $ cd /home
    $ sudo gtar -cvMf /mnt/laptop.tar mwlucas

    One annoyance with using an MSDOS-formatted disk for backup is that you can’t have a file larger than 4GB. My home directory is multiple times that. I must use gtar to back up my home directory, and use the multiple-volumes option. When gtar completes a 4GB file, it asks me to prepare a new volume. Move the existing backup file to a different file, then hit return to have gtar continue.

    While that’s running, let’s get the download files. Go to the OpenBSD mirror list and choose one near you. Use a web browser to verify that the shapshot on the site is current. Open a FTP session to that site, and grab all the bsd* and *.tgz files.

    ftp> cd pub/OpenBSD/snapshots/amd64
    250 Directory successfully changed.
    ftp> prompt
    Interactive mode off.
    ftp> mget bsd*
    wait
    ftp> mget *.tgz
    wait…

    Verify the checksums of the downloaded files against the checksums in the SHA256 file on the FTP site.

    $ cksum -a sha256 *

    I have backups. I have the files, and they aren’t corrupt. We are now at the point of no return. You can still follow the recommended upgrade procedure. I encourage you to do so.

    Shut down all unnecessary processes. If you’re forwarding packets, stop. If you’re in X, exit to a text console. Kill all daemons that aren’t necessary for a minimally-running system.

    Copy your desired kernel to the root directory. I’m using the multiprocessor kernel. Also save a copy of your current reboot command.

    $ rm /obsd ; ln /bsd /obsd && cp bsd.mp /nbsd && mv /nbsd /bsd
    $ cp bsd.rd /
    $ cp bsd /bsd.sp

    Now overwrite the nonessential parts of your userland.

    $ tar -C / -xzvphf xserv49.tgz
    $ tar -C / -xzphf xfont49.tgz
    $ tar -C / -xzphf xshare49.tgz
    $ tar -C / -xzphf xbase49.tgz
    $ tar -C / -xzphf game49.tgz
    $ tar -C / -xzphf comp49.tgz
    $ tar -C / -xzphf man49.tgz

    Do not extract the etc49.tgz distribution, as that will overwrite your core system configuration! You must update /etc separately.

    Update the core programs last. The core system includes programs like tar and reboot. Once you update the core, your system is running a new userland on an old kernel.

    $ tar -C / -xzphf base49.tgz

    Your system is now basically unusable; you have new binaries running on an old kernel. You must reboot now. Afterwards, I’m running:

    OpenBSD 4.9-beta (GENERIC.MP) #777: Tue Jan 18 13:56:34 MST 2011

    Generate the new device nodes.

    $ cd /dev/
    $ sudo ./MAKEDEV all

    I prefer to reboot after recreating device nodes. The new reboot command is now usable. After the next reboot everything looks fine, except for this message:

    Could not load host key: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key

    So, there’s a new key type. I’ll get that as I upgrade /etc, by running sysmerge(8). Go to the snapshot directory and run:

    $ sudo sysmerge -s etc49.tgz -x xetc49.tgz

    Sysmerge will compare your installed /etc with the snapshot fileset and show you the diffs. You can install the new file, delete the new file, or merge the two together. If you’ve used mergemaster(8), sysmerge(8) will be no surprise.

    Then reboot again. With the new /etc, OpenBSD automatically generates the missing SSH key for the new crypto algorithm.

    My system is now upgraded.

    In the interest of sanity, I need to remove and reinstall all the packages on this system. This isn’t a big deal, except for those few that must be built as ports because I require something unusual. Set PKG_PATH to the packages directory of your closest FTP mirror and run pkg_add -ui

    $ sudo pkg_add -iu
    quirks-1.32: ok
    ORBit2-2.14.19:libiconv-1.13p0->libiconv-1.13p2: ok
    ORBit2-2.14.19:pcre-7.9->pcre-8.02p1: ok
    ORBit2-2.14.19:libgamin-0.1.10->libgamin-0.1.10p3: ok
    ORBit2-2.14.19:gettext-0.17p0->gettext-0.18.1p0: ok
    ...

    Walk away.

    In this particular case, pkg_add crashed when my chosen FTP mirror limited the number of successive connections from my IP address. I raised this on misc@, and got an answer and a fix almost immediately.

    So, even fools like me can get help. But don’t count on it.

    mod_security2 case sensitive?

    I’ve written previously about using mod_security to block referral spam and hosts on a DNS-based RBL.  I thought it was working pretty well, until I looked at my referrers today and saw lots of hits from “FreePornVideos.bogus” (domain name & suffix altered).  I shouldn’t see this, as my mod_security rules include:

    SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:REFERER "porn" deny,status:500

    Lots of mod_security documentation claims that matches are case-insensitive.  I should not be seeing this.  What’s going on?  I believe that the problem is that the referral matches are case-sensitive, but let’s verify that.  First, let’s try a simple referral in lower case.

    $ wget http://www.michaelwlucas.com/ --referer=porn
    --2011-01-19 10:17:32--  http://www.michaelwlucas.com/
    Resolving www.michaelwlucas.com (www.michaelwlucas.com)... 198.22.63.8
    Connecting to www.michaelwlucas.com (www.michaelwlucas.com)|198.22.63.8|:80... connected.
    HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 500 Internal Server Error
    2011-01-19 10:17:32 ERROR 500: Internal Server Error.

    That works as expected.  Now try with a capital letter:

    $ wget http://www.michaelwlucas.com/ --referer=Porn
    --2011-01-19 10:17:34--  http://www.michaelwlucas.com/
    Resolving www.michaelwlucas.com (www.michaelwlucas.com)... 198.22.63.8
    Connecting to www.michaelwlucas.com (www.michaelwlucas.com)|198.22.63.8|:80... connected.
    HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
    Length: 10376 (10K) [text/html]
    Saving to: `index.html'

    Matches are case sensitive, despite what I read in the documentation.  Listing both Porn and porn won’t solve the problem, because that won’t protect me from pORN.

    Lesson of the day: verify you’re reading the correct documentation, and that you read what the author actually wrote.  mod_security2 uses PCRE for regular expressions. Version 1 used POSIX.  If I want case-insensitive matching, I have to declare that in my regex.  I modified the rule to read:

    SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:REFERER "(?i:(porn))" deny,status:500

    Reload Apache. Test again with wget.  Both porn and Porn are now blocked, as well as pORN.  Petulance of the day remediated. Now back to BGP.

    identifying probable intrusion vectors with flow data

    Shortly after Absolute FreeBSD came out, I worked with gpart(8) and thought “I should have put this in the book.”  Just after Cisco Routers for the Desperate went to the printer, I worked with tracking gateway availability and said “Drat!  This should have gone into the book!”  This is a recurring motif in my life.

    Now that Network Flow Analysis is out, I should have marked calendar space for “interesting flow analysis opportunity.”  If you want to know the details behind all of this, look in the book or in the flow-tools documentation.

    Someone recently penetrated a dev server I help support. I want to learn how they got access, using flow data.  I have no idea if this is realistic, but let’s go for it.  I previously made a reasonable guess about the date the host was compromised, so I know the time window to examine. I’ll attack the problem by identifying “known good” traffic, removing it from the data, and examining what remains. (This might not be the best method, but I know that a couple security and intrusion response folks read this blog, and one in particular won’t hesitate to tell me I’m fubar, so check for comments.)

    First, let’s see the traffic this host sends and receives.

    # flow-cat 2010-11-09/ft* | flow-nfilter -F ip-addr -v ADDR=189.22.36.165 | flow-print | less

    srcIP            dstIP            prot  srcPort  dstPort  octets      packets
    189.22.36.165    194.28.157.50    6     7781     80       40          1
    194.28.157.50    189.22.36.165    6     80       7781     40          1
    189.22.36.165    194.28.157.50    6     9008     80       40          1
    189.22.36.165    194.28.157.50    6     9008     80       40          1
    194.28.157.50    189.22.36.165    6     80       9008     80          2
    189.22.36.165    194.28.157.50    6     6625     80       80          2
    194.28.157.50    189.22.36.165    6     80       6625     80          2
    189.22.36.165    82.135.96.18     6     445      59423    80          2
    82.135.96.18     189.22.36.165    6     59423    445      96          2
    189.22.36.165    72.167.161.47    6     80       51428    40          1
    72.167.161.47    189.22.36.165    6     51404    21       84          2
    ...

    This machine is an Ubuntu box.  It regularly contacts random Internet sites to check for updates.  The developer also browses the Web from it.  If I’m to have any luck, I must exclude Web browsing traffic from this host.  (To the best of my knowledge, there is not yet a Web site that will automatically root any Unix-like system.  I might be wrong.)  I normally configure most filtering on the command line, but this is complicated enough that I need to write an actual filter for it.


    filter-primitive port80
    type ip-port
    permit 80

    filter-primitive victim
    type ip-address
    permit 189.22.36.165

    filter-definition victim-browsing
    invert
    match ip-source-address victim
    match ip-destination-port port80
    or
    match ip-destination-address victim
    match ip-source-port port80

    We match all traffic from the victim machine to port 80, and from port 80 to the victim machine, then invert the filter to exclude everything that matches. Add this filter to the command line and we get:

    srcIP            dstIP            prot  srcPort  dstPort  octets      packets
    189.22.36.165    82.135.96.18     6     445      59423    80          2
    82.135.96.18     189.22.36.165    6     59423    445      96          2
    189.22.36.165    72.167.161.47    6     80       51428    40          1
    72.167.161.47    189.22.36.165    6     51404    21       84          2
    72.167.161.47    189.22.36.165    6     49768    21       296         6
    189.22.36.165    72.167.161.47    6     21       49768    262         3
    72.167.161.47    189.22.36.165    6     51428    80       40          1
    ...

    Some interesting things here. This machine shouldn’t be running a SMB server, but the first two flows show that someone connected to us on port 445, we answered, and we sent a bunch of data. The developer owner probably installed Samba as a dependency of something else she installed, and never even noticed. Nobody on the outside world should be talking to this machine’s Web site, but it’s not that surprising that someone did. There’s a small FTP query next; I suspect it’s one of the innumerable FTP scanners.

    There’s still 1,690 lines of this stuff; far too much to assess by eye.  Let’s trim it down by assuming this is the most common sort of intrusion.

    Generally, an intruder attacks a service on a machine. He would then send the code for the exploit or IRC bouncer to the machine through that service.  Let’s make the (uncertain and unreliable) assumption that one or the other of these is larger than 1 packet.  Most DNS transactions, pings, etc, are 1 packet, so by looking for flows larger than 1 packet we exclude this innocuous traffic.  The following primitive and filter only passes flows larger than 1 packet.

    filter-primitive gt1packet
    type counter
    permit gt 1

    filter-definition gt1packet
    match packets gt1packet

    Now add |flow-nfilter -F gt1packet to the command line and see what remains. The following immediately stands out:

    ...
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     3703        19
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4383     3095        11
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     6667     4384     120         3
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     6667     4385     120         3
    ...

    The first port 6667 connections are to a host 79.115.103.225, a Romanian system. Let’s strip out all of the previous filters and see what traffic these two hosts have exchanged. There’s a lot of SSH traffic, more than we see from the usual brute-force guesser.

    # flow-cat 2010-11-09/ft* | flow-nfilter -F ip-addr -v ADDR=189.22.36.165 | \
       flow-nfilter -F ip-addr -v ADDR=79.115.103.225  | flow-print | less
    srcIP            dstIP            prot  srcPort  dstPort  octets      packets
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4381     22       371         6
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4381     394         7
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4383     22       1984        14
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     3703        19
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4383     3095        11
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     6667     4384     120         3
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     6667     4385     120         3
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4384     6667     192         3
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       11804       118
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4385     6667     192         3
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     12688       103
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       1664        19
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       5564        64
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     9708        50
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       14956       169
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     16060       129
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       1040        12
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     928         8
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     8888     4470     120         3
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4470     8888     192         3
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       4316        49
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     11344       42
    79.115.103.225   189.22.36.165    6     4382     22       1924        23
    189.22.36.165    79.115.103.225   6     22       4382     8800        20
    ...
    

    Using flow-print -f 5, I can view the timestamps and verify that the IRC activity started shortly after the SSH activity started using larger amounts of bandwidth.

    Can I be certain that 79.115.103.225 is my attacker? No. Is this activity suspicious? Absolutely. I can examine the hacked machine, or a disk image thereof, and identify the account used to penetrate the machine.

    This is not proof, but it’s a place to start. In assessing the rest of the data, I can now exclude this host. This will further reduce the pool of data I am assessing.

    While I can’t use this as grounds for flying to Romania with body armor, a machine gun, and a machete, I can realistically act on this information. I can report the activity to the IP address owner. I can check my network for other connections from this host, and verify the integrity of any machines it’s connected to. I can use this a a part of my business case to firewall off this part of the network. It will support my argument to forbid passwords for SSH connections on dev machines.

    In retrospect, I could have made other assumptions that might have let me find this more quickly, e.g., I could have investigated the first hosts contacted on the questionable ports. But every puzzle is easy once you’ve solved it. After this, I’d have to say that backtracking intrusion vectors through flow data is very practical, even when you don’t have much experience.

    dating an intrusion with flow data

    One of my Ubuntu dev boxes was broken into. While the box isn’t vital, I’ll still need to reinstall an operating system and set it back up for the developer. I want to know where the attack came from and what the intruder did.  I cannot trust the logs on the system, but I can trust the flow data from our upstream router.

    I’ve changed my IP addresses, but remote addresses are left unchanged. Here I examine my flow data from 1 January 2011, and remove IP addresses I expect to contact this machine.


    # flow-cat ft* | flow-nfilter -F ip-addr -v ADDR=189.22.36.165 | flow-print | grep -v mgmt.ip.ad.dr | grep -v dev.ip.add.dr | less
    srcIP            dstIP            prot  srcPort  dstPort  octets      packets
    189.22.36.165    208.83.20.130    6     60702    6667     198         3
    189.22.36.165    208.83.20.130    6     60703    6667     196         3
    208.83.20.130    189.22.36.165    6     6667     60702    152         3
    208.83.20.130    189.22.36.165    6     6667     60703    152         3
    ...

    So, what do I learn here? This system was compromised on or before New Years’ Day. 208.83.20.130 is an IRC server, and 6667 is an IRC port.  Someone is using my system to play IRC games. Bastards. Other checks show that the intruders are also using port 7000.

    I don’t know exactly when the system was compromised.  Fortunately, I have my old flow records.  I go back and check the first of each previous month, narrowing down the time window.  1 December looks like 1 January, but 1 November looks different:

    srcIP            dstIP            prot  srcPort  dstPort  octets      packets
    189.22.36.165    189.22.37.222    17    123      123      76          1
    189.22.36.222    189.22.36.165    17    123      123      76          1
    206.80.36.88     189.22.36.165    17    65015    5060     368         1
    189.22.36.165    206.80.36.88     1     0        771      396         1
    129.82.138.38    189.22.36.165    1     0        2048     28          1
    ...

    The port 123 UDP traffic is NTP.  And someone poked at me with a SIP client, but we didn’t answer. This is about what I’d expect to see on a machine sitting naked on the Internet.

    Next, search to narrow down the time window. When I find the first day the IRC server traffic appears, I know when to start looking for the actual intrusion activity. When was the first day that port 6667 and 7000 traffic appeared?  It was present on 1 December, but not 1 November.  Check November 15: present, November 7: present, etc, etc.  Eventually, I see the traffic is present on 9 November, but not on 8 November.


    # cd /var/db/flows/rtr8/2010/2010-11
    # flow-cat 2010-11-09/ft* | flow-nfilter -F ip-addr -v ADDR=189.22.36.165 | flow-nfilter -F not-ip-port -v PORT=80 | flow-nfilter -F not-ip-port -v PORT=53 | flow-nfilter -F not-ip-port -v PORT=123 | flow-print | grep -c 7000
    947

    # flow-cat 2010-11-08/ft* | flow-nfilter -F ip-addr -v ADDR=189.22.36.165 | flow-nfilter -F not-ip-port -v PORT=80 | flow-nfilter -F not-ip-port -v PORT=53 | flow-nfilter -F not-ip-port -v PORT=123 | flow-print | grep -c 7000
    0

    The intrusion happened on or before 9 November 2011.

    Next I will examine the traffic for 8 and 9 November and see if I can determine where the intruders came from and their attack vector. I haven’t done that analysis yet, so who knows what I’ll find, if anything, but I’ll post on my efforts one way or another.

    UPDATE: Oh, right, I’m an author. While I shouldn’t blatantly pimp myself out here, when I do an on-book-topic post, I should at least say “Hey, if you want to do this too, you can learn how by reading my newest book.” Sheesh. Being non-commercial is one thing, being actively daft is another.

    mod_security rule upgrades and logging

    I recently installed mod_security2 on my personal Web server to block out the most annoying referral spam. It blocked the worst offenders.  Then I found that mod_security also included the ability to block all access from sites in a DNS-based RBL. This would further reduce my comment and referral spam problems, at the cost of making the site slightly slower.  There are also rules to block SQL injection attacks and other known attack vectors.  If you’re trying to read this from a machine on DNS blacklists, stop reading and go get yourself off the blacklist.

    The RBL rules aren’t in the base FreeBSD package. They’re in the newer mod_security2 ruleset, available from mod_security’s Sourceforge download page. Get the newest file.

    Move your existing rules to a safe place, and put the new rules where the old rules were.  Do not delete your old rules, you’ll want them for reference.  In my case, the active rules directory is /usr/local/etc/apache22/Includes/mod_security2.  I moved the existing directory to /usr/local/etc/apache22/Includes/old-mod_security2, created a new mod_security2 directory, and unzipped the rules it there.

    The rules directory contains an example rule file, modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf.example.  Apache will read any file that ends in .conf as a config file, so copy (not move) that example to modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf.  Edit that file to include changes from the original setup, e.g.:

    SecRuleEngine On
    SecDataDir /var/run/modsecurity

    Copy your referer.conf referrer blacklist into the new rules directory.  Then reload Apache.  If Apache won’t restart, read the error messages and correct them.

    Now that you have the base rules upgraded, you can add rules from the optional_rules directory.  I specifically want the comment spam blocking, so I copied modsecurity_crs_42_comment_spam.conf to the main directory and reloaded Apache.

    Then use wget to test my work, using one of the less offensive referral spam sites as a referrer. (I’ve changed the name of the site to avoid giving them any more links.)

    avarice/tmp$ wget http://www.michaelwlucas.com/ --referer=http://www.fishingscum.com

    –2011-01-04 17:04:06–  http://www.michaelwlucas.com/
    Resolving www.michaelwlucas.com (www.michaelwlucas.com)… 198.22.63.8
    Connecting to www.michaelwlucas.com (www.michaelwlucas.com)|198.22.63.8|:80… connected.
    HTTP request sent, awaiting response… 500 Internal Server Error
    2011-01-04 17:04:06 ERROR 500: Internal Server Error.

    That’s what I want.

    As I had to take the time to upgrade, I wanted to also get a log of what hits I was blocking.  This only took adding two lines to the configuration:

    SecDebugLogLevel 1
    SecDebugLog /var/log/modsecurity.log

    My wget request generated this log entry:

    [04/Jan/2011:17:04:06 --0500] [www.michaelwlucas.com/sid#801948060][rid#801aa20a0][/][1] Access denied with code 500 (phase 2). Pattern match "fishingscum" at REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer. [file "/usr/local/etc/apache22/Includes/mod_security2/referer.conf"] [line "35"]

    Setting SecDebugLogLevel to 2 gave me details on how mod_security2 processed its logs.  That will be useful if I ever have to write my own mod_security2 rules.  I suspect that if I have to do that, though, I’m solving the wrong problem.

    One interesting thing I saw here was how the log statement in mod_security2 rules is applied.  If you use the log keyword in a rule, a log message appears in the standard Apache access and error logs as well as the mod_security2.  If you do not use the log statement, a message appears in the modsecurity log but not in the Apache logs.  An anti-referral-spam rule should look like this:

    SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:REFERER "ezinearticles" deny,status:500

    24 hours later, WordPress shows only 5 comments in my anti-spam queue.  Another annoyance quashed.

    UPDATE: More here.

    TechChannel interview published

    The video interview I did last month is now available on-line.  It’s about NetFlow, and is based on the Network Flow Analysis book.

    I can’t bring myself to watch it.

    (Two posts in one day.  This can’t be good.)

    UPDATE: No, it’s not good. Apparently, WordPress doesn’t show the links on the front page, even though it shows the complete article. You must click to the individual article to see the link to the interview. I’m sure there’s a perfectly good reason WP behaves this way, but it still feels bogus.